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THE PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO THE
INTERPRETATION OF SALES
TAX STATUTES
JACK C. DAvis*
If sales tax statutes are to be interpreted rationally, courts must
undertake a determination of legislative purpose. But a court which
adopts a purposive approach is confronted with formidable problems.
The author searches for the causes of defects in communication be-
tween courts and legislatures, and proposes an approach to judicial
interpretation and legislative drafting which will provide a basis for
rational construction of sales tax statutes.
This article considers the practice and efficacy of the purposive
approach to the interpretation of sales tax statutes. There is a severe
lack of rational method in interpretation in this area, since the courts
often either do not employ the purposive approach at all, or they do
so inadequately. This, of course, is not unique to sales tax statutory
construction. But what is somewhat unique is that legislators have too
often enacted statutes with no ascertainable primary purpose to guide
the courts. In this situation, method proves to be quite fruitless. What
follows is an examination of the interrelationship between court and
legislature and suggestion of instances in which institutional duties
have been ignored and those in which these duties have been expertly
performed.'
I. MANUFACTURERS TAX
The case of In re Taxes, Hawaiian Pineapple Co.2 serves as an
interesting introduction to the intricacies of statutory interpretation.
The taxpayer operated a manufacturing plant in Honolulu where
raw pineapple juice was boiled and hermetically sealed in tin cans.
* Member of the Illinois and Michigan Bars.
1 This study adopts the purposive approach to statutory construction. To substantiate
the principles of interpretation used, citation will often be made to Hart & Sacks, The
Legal Process; Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1306-1848 (tent. ed.
1958). It is assumed the reader is quite familiar with the work and conversant with the
analysis supporting the conclusions found therein.
Not considered will be the role of the administrator in statutory construction, even
though it is an important one in the tax area. There are two reasons. First, the courts give
only slight recognition to administrative interpretation in deciding the cases studied. The
courts rarely advance any presumption of correctness of administrative rulings. Secondly,
in the cases examined, this writer feels the criticized decisions so clearly inadequate that
administrative regulations consistent with the decisions should have been overturned in
any event.
2 45 Haw. 167, 363 P.2d 990 (1961).
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The taxpayer also hermetically sealed uncooked raw pineapple in
tin cans and froze it until shipment. The tax commissioner con-
tended that both processes fit within the meaning of "canning" as
used in the statute.' The taxpayer argued that only the first process
could be considered "canning," for the common and trade meanings of
"canning" require sterilization by heat to kill the bacteria in the
product so that it may be stored with no further concern for its
preservation. The type of container is irrelevant, for after the "can-
ning" process, a product may be sealed in a glass jar or bottle as well as
a tin can.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed the ruling of the tax
appeal court in favor of the taxpayer. The court began by quoting
Sutherland on Statutory Construction: "[I]n the absence of a legisla-
tive intent to the contrary, commercial terms when used in a statute re-
lating to trade or commerce are presumed to have been used in their
trade or commercial meaning."' The court said that this rule of inter-
pretation applied not only to statutes regulating commerce but also to
taxation statutes when addressed to industry. Since the commissioner in
his brief agreed with the taxpayer that "canning" in the trade sense
required preservation by sterilization before disposition in containers,
the court was well on its way to concluding the case. But the possibility
that the legislature intended a meaning that might conflict with the
trade understanding remained as a key issue.
The commissioner argued that the statute revealed a legislative
3 The statute read in pertinent part:
Imposition of tax. There is hereby levied and shall be assessed and collected
annually privilege taxes against the persons on account of their business and other
activities in this Territory measured by the application of rates against values,
gross proceeds of sales or gross income, as the case may be, as follows:
A. Tax on manufacturers. (1) Upon every person engaging or continuing
within this Territory in the business of manufacturing, compounding, canning,
preserving, packing, milling, processing, refining or preparing for sale, profit or
commercial use, either directly or through the activity of others, in whole or in
part, any article or articles, substance or substances, commodity or commodities,
the amount of such tax to be equal to the value of the articles, substances, or
commodities, manufactured, compounded, canned, preserved, packed, milled,
processed, refined or prepared for sale, as shown by the gross proceeds derived
from the sale thereof by the manufacturer or person compounding or preparing
the same (except as hereinafter provided) multiplied by the respective rates as
follows:
Millers or processors of sugar, raw or refined, two and one-half per cent;
canneries, two and one-half per cent; all manufacturers on whose gross income
a tax is not otherwise levied in this chapter, one and one-half per cent.
Hawaii Rev. Laws § 5455 (1945), as amended by Haw. Sess. Laws 1947, act 3.
4 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction 442 (3d ed. 1943).
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intent to employ the ordinary and popular meaning, not that of the
trade. He contended that this statute always spelled out special mean-
ings and that, in defining wholesaler and jobber, the legislature specifi-
cally provided that the trade meaning should govern. Since the legisla-
ture failed to do either of these with "canning," the popular meaning
must control. The court did not think this evidence of legislative intent
compelling; it certainly was not sufficient to overcome the presumption
arising from Sutherland's rule of construction, particularly since the
legislature deleted the phrase "known to the trade as such" in defining
wholesaler and jobber in 1957.1 Evidently, the legislature eliminated
the phrase because it realized that the terms would be so read without
the language.
But, assuming that the commissioner was right about the legisla-
ture's intent, the court considered the ordinary meanings of "canning,"
and to this end it investigated dictionary and encyclopedia definitions.
It concluded from these two sources together that the popular and
trade meanings were the same. It found little merit in the commis-
sioner's objection that encyclopedias should not be used for this pur-
pose, but said that, even with dictionaries alone, taxpayer's contention
as to the popular meaning was as reasonable as the commissioner's and
in tax cases doubts are resolved in the taxpayer's favor.
The commissioner further argued, "That the legislature intended
to impose the 22 % rate on pineapple products is expressed in Stand.
Com. Rep. No. 85, 1935 Senate Journal 422-423.1' 1 The committee
report stated:
This bill is the much publicized Gross Income Tax Bill, which
proposes to levy a tax of 24 % in a general way against those com-
ing under the definition of "Retailers" and Y4 to 1% against those
defined as "Wholesalers," at the same time levying the higher rate
against sugar and pineapples immediately before such products enter
into interstate or foreign commerce. It is described as a privilege
tax,--a tax for the privilege of doing business in the Territory of
Hawaii. This is the backbone of the administration's tax program.7
The evident argument of the commissioner was that this statutory
purpose should influence the court to define words in such a way as
to encompass the pineapple industry within the 22 percent rate when-
ever possible. The court found this unconvincing because the report sug-
gested no particular type of pineapple products to be included in the
word "canned." Also, since canneries other than pineapple canneries
processed on the island, if the legislature meant to heavily burden only
r, Haw. Sess. Laws 1957, act 34.
6 In re Taxes Hawaiian Pineapple Co., supra note 2, at 1S3, 363 P.2d at 999.
7 Ibid.
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pineapples, it would "not be unreasonable"' to find more specific lan-
guage than "canneries." Moreover, the tax administrators consistently
levied on pineapple by-products at the lower manufacturer's rate. In
sum, the court thought this evidence of legislative intent also too
negligible to influence the application of the rule of construction and
the consequent presumption of trade meaning.
The court went on to cite a recent federal case9 which held that
the Interstate Commerce Commission was not arbitrary or capricious
when it ruled the word "canned" in the Commission's certificates of
convenience did not authorize the transporting of frozen fruit products
in hermetically sealed cans.
In construing the statute in the manner described above, the
court employed inadequate tools of analysis. Its analysis should have
commenced with a thorough review of the statute, attempting to iden-
tify any underlying, pervasive legislative purpose. This should give
the proper direction and emphasis in interpretation. This is a dif-
ficult task, but there are a number of aids. The court should imagine
itself in the role of the legislature and seek out the "mischief" that
this provision sought to remedy. What motivated its enactment? To
find the answer the court should analyze the prior state of the law,
draw on general public knowledge of the prevalent "evils" of the time,
consult the pronouncements of political and legislative leaders, and
examine the internal legislative history.'"
In this case, one could conclude that the purpose was simply to
raise revenue-so all problems of interpretation ought to be resolved
in such a way as to produce more income for the government. But
this purpose carries little significance for two reasons. First, it may
be argued that such a purpose should not be inferred in a jurisdiction
that accepts the general rule that taxation statutes are to be construed
strictly against the government." Second, this broad statutory pur-
pose pales in relation to purposes manifest in the specific section at
issue. Canneries and sugar millers are set apart and are required to
contribute much more than other manufacturers taxed at this level.
Why did the legislature do this? What motivated the differentiation?
The court can give a meaningful interpretation to the words of the
section only by uncovering this motivation and construing the words
in its context. This the court in Hawaiian Pineapple failed to do.
8 Ibid.
9 McDowall Transport v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 681 (SD. Fla. 1955).
1O Hart & Sacks, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1414-17.
11 See generally policies of clear statement and maxims of construction, Id. at
1412-13.
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It may well have been that the legislature wished in some way to
punish or retaliate against owners of the pineapple and sugar indus-
tries for their exploitation of Hawaiian resources. But the court must
presume the legislature to be a body of reasonable men which enacts
rational legislation, particularly in this case where no "due process"
or "equal protection" issues were raised.12 Thus, the court must iden-
tify the rational basis for the differentiation made in the statute. Three
possibilities are readily apparent.
One rationale is that the legislature saw the canning and sugar
industries as well established and assured of competing successfully
in Hawaii and on mainland United States because of their proximity
to and control over the products marketed. Thus, the higher tax rate
could be passed on by these industries with no appreciable decline in
sales. This is particularly significant with "canning" in light of the
fact that "the pineapple industry is one of Hawaii's leading industries
and the amount of canning done in the industry is immeasurably
greater than that done by other canners in Hawaii. . . ."' It is not
unlikely therefore that the legislature used the word "canning" as re-
ferring only to the pineapple industry and regarded Hawaiian pine-
apples as able to do well in competition on the mainland despite a
small price rise. The Senate report reproduced above indicates that
'canneries" meant pineapple canneries to the legislators. 4
The court reacted to the commissioner's contention that only the
pineapple industry was referred to by stating that if the legislature
meant pineapple alone it could have so indicated. This is a penetrating
argument in some instances,"5 but not here. The court should have
faced the problem of explaining the differentiated rate. In fact, it was
imperative to do so in order to avoid the implication that the higher
rate was simply arbitrary and discriminatory. In so doing, it would
have made apparent that when "canneries" is thought of as meaning
pineapple canneries many sound reasons can be offered for the rate
differential. But if "canneries" is interpreted blindly as referring
to all canneries, no matter how obscure the others may be, the
higher rate seems only a senseless fiat.
The court did not insist on precise terminology in another in-
stance. The suggestion was made that since "canneries" may mean
places where the business of canning is carried on, the 22 percent
cannery rate should apply to all manufacturing done in a cannery,
12 Id. at 1415.
13 In re Taxes, Hawaiian Pineapple Co., supra note 2, at 183, 363 P.2d at 999.
14 See text accompanying note 7 supra. See generally problems of use of legislative
history, id at 1242-84.
15 See generally id. at 1220-22.
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whether the products manufactured are "canned" or not. The court
countered:
However, a construction producing that result would be wholly
at variance with the overall purpose and patent general intent
of the excise tax law to impose the tax in all cases on the income
earner according to the nature of his particular business, and not on
the basis of the place where it is conducted. Such intent undoubtedly
might have been more-exactly expressed in fixing the rate for can-
ning by the use of the term "canners" in place of "canneries,"
comparably to and consistently with the designation "millers or
processors" in the preceding clause fixing the rate for sugar pro-
duction. Notwithstanding this possible inexactness of terminology,
we think it clear from a consideration of the framework and scheme
of the entire statute, that the particular provisions under considera-
tion must be construed to mean products manufactured in a plant
which may be designated a "cannery" are not subject to the two
and one-half per cent cannery rate unless they are "canned."' 1
Here the court evidenced the proper concern for the "overall purpose"
and "general intent" of the statute which it omitted in concluding that
canneries" could not refer to pineapple canneries alone.
It is interesting to note that in 1957 the legislature changed the
word "canneries" in the statute to "pineapple canneries (including
canning of pineapple juice).'m This occurred after the period in ques-
tion in the lawsuit, but should it have been completely ignored by the
court? It is conceivable that the legislature thought one meaning
should govern before 1957 and another thereafter. In such case, the
amendment lacks significance. But in the absence of strong evidence
to this effect, when logic leads to the same conclusion about meaning
as is codified in a recent amendment, the amendment should at least
take on significance as giving some assurance that reason is following
the right path.
Another explanation for the higher rate may be found in the cir-
cumstance that the bulk of the products of these two industries is
shipped out of Hawaii. Since Hawaii taxes at the retail and wholesale
levels as well as the manufacturing level,"8 without the higher rate,
sugar and pineapple products would be taxed only once at the same
rate as other products and then sail out of reach of Hawaiian taxes
while the other products for local consumption suffer two more levies.
Thus, locally consumed goods would be taxed more heavily than pine-
apple and sugar. The legislature may have intended the higher rate
to bring approximate equality in the taxation on manufactured prod-
16 In re Taxes Hawaiian Pineapple Co., supra note 2, at 175, 363 P.2d at 995.
17 Haw. Sp. S.L. 1957, act 1.
18 Haw. S.L. 1955, ch. 117.
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ucts. The Standing Committee seems to imply this rationale when it
says that there should be a levy of "the higher rate against sugar and
pineapples immediately before such products enter into interstate or
foreign commerce." 9
A third possible legislative purpose might have been to enact
something in the nature of a progressive corporate tax. It may be
judicially noticed that pineapple and sugar are so stable economically
that they could easily contribute more to the revenues than other rela-
tively poor manufacturers, many of which may still need nurturing.
Competitive conditions and ability to shift would then be irrelevant.
This is a sensible rationale, but it is perhaps too unlike the common
manner of taxing corporations to be readily attributed without express
legislative recognition. 20 Thus, there are at least three plausible pur-
poses that may have motivated the statutory provision at issue.
The court should next read the words in the provision at issue in
light of the formulated purposes. The key words are "canned" and
"canning." Any meaning attributed to these words must be one that
the words will bear. Words cannot be construed to mean anything the
interpreter wishes, even though a meaning the words will not bear
seems most in tune with legislative purpose.2 ' The dictionary assists
in identifying meanings that words will bear. The court found in the
dictionaries2 2 that possible meanings were: (1) to preserve in cans
19 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
20 See generally Hart & Sacks, op. dt. supra note 1, at 1413.
21 Hart & Sacks, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1225-26. For an example of a case in which
the legislative purpose indicated a meaning the words would not bear, see Olin Mathieson
Chem. Corp. v. W. A. Johnson, 257 N.C. 666, 127 S.E.2d 262 (1962). The clear purpose
of the insecticide exemption was to keep costs down on chemicals used in farming. It
seems that in the Mathieson case the chemical in issue impeded plant growth and thereby
kept eggs from being laid on the plant. The court felt it could not bring this chemical
within the meaning of "insecticides." What if eggs were laid on plants treated with plant
growth inhibitor but were unable to hatch because of the arrested plant growth? Could
it then be considered an insecticide? The North Carolina statute was amended to include
"herbicide" within the exemptions allowed by the provision at issue in this case. Can
"herbicide" bear a meaning that would include growth inhibitors as well as plant
destroyers?
22 The Oxford English Dictionary (1933) defines "canning" as:
The preserving of meat, fish, fruit, etc., by sealing up in cans or tins; tinning.
From Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.) 1934, are the following:
can (kan), v.t.; CANNED (kand) ; CANNING. 1. To put in a can or cans;
to preserve by putting in sealed cans or jars.
canned (kand), adj. 1. Preserved in cans, as canned goods.
canning (kan' ing), n. The process or business of sealing food in cans or jars,
esp. for commercial distribution.
The third reference is to Funk & Wagnalls' New Standard Dictionary (1956) which
defines "canning" as: "The act, process, or business of preserving fruits, vegetables, or
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by cooking and sealing, or (2) to put or seal in cans or jars. Encyclo-
pedias and trade terminology also aid in determining meaning. Both
of these indicated that "canning," in technical usage, meant preserving
in cans with heat sterilization. Maxims of construction supply a third
source.23 One such maxim reads, "every word and clause must be
given effect," and another, "words are to be interpreted according to
the proper grammatical effect of their arrangement within the stat-
ute."24 The taxing section encompasses both "canning" and "preserv-
ing" ("canned" and "preserved"). If canning meant nothing other
than preserving in cans by cooking, as the taxpayer contended and
the court decided, why was the word "canning" even inserted? If every
word is to be given effect, certainly "canning" must refer to something
other than just a process of preservation. The other meaning could
well be the sealing of products in cans.25 In any event, this indicates
that the words will bear the meaning sought by the commissioner.
From this analysis, two meanings seem possible. But only one is
totally consistent with any of the three possible purposes-that which
includes anything sealed in a can.
If with the first formulation the court adheres to the legislative
assumption that pineapple canneries and sugar millers can shift the
tax and still readily compete, it follows that frozen pineapple juice
should be regarded as able to sell as well with a slightly higher price
forced upon it by the statute. Therefore, the meaning of "canning"
should prevail which brings the frozen juice under the higher rate.
However, it may be thought that the court must analyze competitive
conditions for each product or at least for the industry as a whole,
for the true legislative purpose was to tax more heavily, provided that
competitive conditions were such that the shifting could take place.
The proviso stems from an overriding purpose to keep the two indus-
tries economically sound. But such a formulation is not appealing. It
produces the type of litigation the anti-trust laws have forced on the
federal courts. The judicial process is not well suited for fact finding
of this scope. 6 Courts should be hesitant to make this type of deter-
mination unless conditions have changed to such a degree that judicial
notice may be employed. Otherwise, the court should assume condi-
meats, by partial cooking or other process, and hermetically sealing in tin cans, glass jars,
etc."
In re Taxes Hawaiian Pineapple Co., supra note 2, at 175-76, 363 P.2d at 1000.
23 Hart & Sacks, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1220-22.
24 Llewellyn, "Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed," 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950).
25 It can be argued that the word "preserving" refers to such processes as the drying
and glazing of fruit while "canning" is used to cover the case of sterilization by heat.
26 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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tions similar to those upon which the legislation is premised and leave
it to the legislature to change the law when the premise is invalid.
The interpretation of a statute should not be based on something as
variable and complex as competitive conditions unless this is clearly
the legislative mandate.2 7
But if a formulation with a proviso is preferred, the next step is
to select the one primary purpose according to the guidelines set out
above .2 The court may well decide that this first discovered purpose
will prove irrelevant, leaving the words to be construed in light of the
other suggested purposes. On the other hand, if this first formulation
of legislative purpose does prove primary, it will then become neces-
sary to delve into the files of the fruit industry in order to determine
the fate of these tins of pineapple.
The higher rate best complies with the thrust of the second pur-
pose. Frozen pineapple juice in cans is just as much an export product
as other pineapple products. It also would escape its fair share of
the total tax burden if not taxed at the higher rate.
Similarly, frozen pineapple should be taxed at the higher rate if
the third tentative purpose is to be effectuated. The progressive tax
would be too easily evaded if it were only necessary to change the
method of preservation.
Thus the court seemingly chose a meaning of "canning" that did
not best comply with discernible legislative purpose. The purposive
meaning is not forced. It is found in dictionaries alongside the alter-
native meaning. It accords with maxims of construction. However, the
significant point is not that a wrong result may have been reached but
that the approach was incorrect. The court erred in not performing
its institutional duty to identify purpose where it is ascertainable.29
Without this foundation in interpretation, the dictionary can be of
little assistance.
II. RETAIL SALES TAx-THE MANUFACTURING EXEMPTION
A. Background
Economists have advocated for many years that the retail sales
taxes of the states should be levied only on sales for final personal
consumption.3" Some of the reasons given are:
27 See generally Hart & Sacks, op. cit. supra note 1, at 398, 1413.
28 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
29 If necessary, further evidence of the court's lack of appreciation of the concept
of purpose can be found in its citation of the McDowall case, supra note 9, where the
purpose behind the statute interpreted by the ICC was so patently different from that in
this case that the result in the former case was not relevant.
30 See, e.g., Jacoby, Retail Sales Taxation (1938); Due, Sales Taxation (1957);
Oster, State Retail Sales Taxation (1957); Studenski, Characteristics, Developments and
Present Status of Consumption Taxes, 8 Law and Contemp. Prob. 417 (1941).
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1. The theoretical basis for the retail sales tax is that of a con-
sumption tax which requires the tax burden to be distributed in pro-
portion to final consumption expenditures. Even assuming shifting,
this distribution cannot be achieved if earlier-than-ultimate sales are
also taxed because of the variation in the number of taxable transac-
tions through which products travel before reaching the ultimate con-
sumer.
2. If producer's goods are taxed, labor intensive production
methods would be more advantageous than capital intensive methods.
This would impair modernization and investment.
3. With shifting, not only the amount of the tax at the early
stage is passed on to the final consumer but also a percentage mark-up
on it. This is known as pyramiding and, of course, becomes more
serious the farther from final consumption the first tax is levied.
4. If there is multiple stage taxation, a greater burden is placed
on non-integrated firms. This stimulates combination.
Some of these reasons may be spurious. That is, it may not be
an evil to burden the capital sector if this is thought to offset capital
favoritism elsewhere. Also, shifting may not be significant enough to
cause concern about unequal tax burdens and pyramiding. Most im-
portantly, the state retail sales tax may perhaps not be best explained
in terms of consumption taxation considering the widespread exemp-
tion of services and the taxation of producer goods. But the state leg-
islatures appear to be influenced, in varying degrees, by the economic
"evils" outlined above. No state taxes sales of articles for resale. All
exempt some producer goods, but these "manufacturing" exemptions
take diverse forms.
The "physical ingredients" rule is the most widespread of the
manufacturing exemptions. In light of the economic theory of taxing
only final personal consumption, this test seems unsound. It is soph-
istry not to tax a manufacturer of copper wire on purchases of copper
on the ground that to do so would cause unequal tax burdens and
pyramiding when at the same time he is taxed on purchases of ma-
chinery or fuel. But the use of this test is justified usually in terms
of its administrative easeY' Undoubtedly revenue considerations also
prompt its enactment."2 It is conceivable that this test actually evi-
dences a rejection of some of the theory outlined above. That is, the
legislature may be adhering to theories that require taxing investment
31 Due, op. cit. supra note 30, at 298; Redlich, "Sales Taxes and the Resale Exemp-
tion in the Manufacture and/or Distribution of Personal Property," 9 Tax L. Rev. 435
(1954).
32 Due, op. cit. supra note 30, at 299.
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goods; the "ingredients" rule serves only as a buffer against the evils
associated with a turnover tax.
A second type of manufacturing exemption excludes transfers of
products "dissipated" in the process of manufacturing. The "physical
ingredients" rule always accompanies this test. In the case of the cop-
per wire manufacturer, fuel consumed would be exempt if used in the
process of manufacturing. But what type of "dissipation" or "con-
sumption" does the test contemplate? Would the test exclude, for
example, machinery? Many states adhere to the notion that to be
"consumed" the product must not have a useful life of more than one
year. Other states always tax machinery without reference to useful
life. 3 This test, more than the "physical ingredients" test, suggests a
sympathetic treatment of the capital sector which is, however, tem-
pered by revenue and administrative considerations. It more fully
complies with the notion of taxing only the final personal consumer
than the "ingredients" rule, but it raises more severe problems of
definition.
The advocates of taxing only final personal consumption no doubt
influenced the few legislatures that have enacted the "used in manu-
facturing" exemption. This exemption is more consistent with the
economic theory; but it still stops short of the theoretical ideal since
it does not exclude all sales to producers. The term "used in manu-
facturing" is rather obtuse phraseology to express a purpose to exempt
all such sales. The West Virginia provision exempting all sales of
materials to persons "in the business of manufacturing" 4 would seem
more appropriate. Moreover, sales of capital goods to distributors are
not exempt as theory would dictate. It is not easy to explain this
"almost but not quite" compliance with theories of ultimate personal
consumption found in the "used in manufacturing" provisions.3 5
33 Redlich, supra note 31.
34 W. Va. Code Ann. § 999(2) (6) (1961).
35 The limitation to "used in manufacturing" is justified by Professor Due in this
way:
Many commodities, such as automobiles, are used for both production and
consumption purposes, often by the same persons. If all commodities which are
utilized as producers goods in any instances are exempted completely (regardless
of use in particular cases), numerous consumer purchases will escape tax. If on
the other hand all purchases by firms for business use are exempted on a basis
conditional upon use, the task of checking upon actual use is a very difficult one
in many instances. Small firms will buy tax free under license goods which the
owners actually employ for consumption purposes.
Due, "The Nature and Structure of Sales Taxation," 9 Vand. L. Rev. 123, 133 (1956).
The failure to consider distributors might be based on:
[T]he view that the selling price of a distributor is governed principally by the
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If all goods sold to producers are not exempt under the "used in
manufacturing" rubric, where should the line be drawn? The most
sensible distinction separates manufacturing from administration, ac-
quisition, distribution, and selling. This distinction can readily be
attributed to the legislature.3 It is workable, although as will be seen
it may cause much administrative difficulty.
Because of the cross-purposes alive in the "manufacturing" ex-
emptions, the legislature has made statutory interpretation a difficult
task for the courts. It often seems that there is no recourse but to flip
through the dictionary in search of the "ordinary" meanings of words.
But some courts have wandered aimlessly through interpretation prob-
lems when the purposive approach would have given significant
guidance.
B. Judicial Floundering
In Bedford v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp.,3 7 the taxpayer,
a producer of steel and coal, contended that numerous articles,
such as feed for mine mules, refractories in steel furnaces, repair tools,
and trucks should not bear a tax under the statute"8 since they "enter
into the process of" manufacturing or compounding. The trial court
held, "such items of tangible personal property as are directly and
proximately used in, and necessary for, the purposes of manufacture
by the company, as well as those which become an ingredient or com-
cost of the product he sells rather than by the cost of the other items he may
buy.... These costs on capital items, it is felt are not an important component
of the retail price as is, for example, the cost of the ingredients or the cost of
the machine which did the fabricating. In this view the selling prices of most
distributors are based on traditional mark-ups.. . .The imposition of a sales
tax on these purchases by wholesalers and retailers, therefore, is not reflected in
the selling prices.
Redlich, supra note 31, at 448. Revenue considerations and a failure to fully understand
the theory involved must also play an instrumental role in the enactment of these pro-
visions.
36 Note, "The Manufacturers Exemption in the Pennsylvania Sales and Use Tax," 58
Dick. L. Rev. 152 (1956).
37 102 Colo. 538, 81 P.2d 752 (1938).
38 The statutory provision at issue read:
Sales to and purchases of tangible personal property by a person engaged in
the business of manufacturing, compounding or furnishing for sale, profit or use,
any article, substance or commodity, which tangible personal property enters
into the processing of, or becomes an ingredient or component part of the
product or service which is manufactured, compounded or furnished and the
container, label, or the furnishing shipping case thereof, shall be deemed to be
wholesale sales and shall be exempt from taxation under [this act].
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 138-5-2 (1964).
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ponent part of the product manufactured,"3 9 are exempt. Under this
test, some non-ingredients escaped taxation, but the lower court still
allowed a levy on machinery and equipment.
The Supreme Court of Colorado commenced its review in good
fashion. It sought out legislative "intent," and it recognized that the
legislature probably wished to avoid pyramiding and double taxation
on the final product offered for resale to the consumer. Yet, there is
a hint that the court thought the legislature wanted to avoid these
"evils" only where ingredients were involved. The court noted that
the legislature levied the tax on retail sales, which term does not in-
clude sales for resale. It then concluded:
The ultimate consumer of all articles purchased and used by a
manufacturer in its manufacturing operations is the manufacturer
and upon the basis of the definitions alone the manufacturer would
be liable for the tax on all such items. It is definitely evident, how-
ever, that the legislature had well in mind that in the ordinary
course of our complex industrial and commercial systems many
articles and commodities are used and consumed by processors
and manufacturers for later resale in altered form.40
Thus, since sales for resale were not taxed, the "ingredient" exemption
was required where, according to the court, there is technically no
resale, but where realistically, a transfer amounting to the same thing
occurs. This justification for the manufacturing exemption does not
apply to the "dissipation" or "used in manufacturing" exemptions be-
cause there is no physical transfer. It is conceivable that the court
either did not see the possible economic "evils" in taxation of non-
ingredient producer goods or thought the legislature did not see them.
Perhaps with this notion of purpose, the court then considered
dictionary meanings of the phrase "enters into." The usual definition
was: "to form a constituent or ingredient part of (as lead enters into
the composition of pewter).' It then found the dictionary definition
of "processing": "a series of actions, motions or occurrences; progres-
sive act or continuous operation or treatment; a series of operations
leading to some result; as a process of manufacture."' At this point,
the court overturned the lower court's exemption of non-ingredients
by concluding: "that to enter into the processing of an article, tangible
personal property must of necessity become a constituent part of such
final product in the series of continuous operations and treatment lead-
39 Bedford v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., supra note 37, at 542, 81 P.2d at 754.
40 Id. at 543-34, 81 P.2d at 755.
41 Id. at 546, 81 P.2d at 755-6.
42 Ibid.
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ing to the result."4 The court felt there was legislative support for
this conclusion due to the unfairness that would result from exempting
substantially all property purchased by a manufacturer when dis-
tributors would still be liable on capital goods used in the conduct of
their businesses. 44 Moreover, the court thought the administrative sim-
plicity of the "physical ingredient" rule argued against a legislative
purpose which would involve courts and administrators in the vagaries
of the "used in manufacturing" test.
As in Hawaiian Pineapple, the court refused to concentrate on
uncovering the likely legislative purpose. In this case, two tools of
analysis would have led to purpose. The first, and most basic, was the
pattern of the statute. The court's conclusion requires a narrowing45
of "enters into the processing of" to the extent that that phrase re-
peats the "physical ingredient" phrase that follows. 46 The use of the
disjunctive makes it extremely improbable that the legislature left
this alternative to the courts, particularly when the word "and" could
easily have been used instead. Thus, the pattern suggests a legislative
purpose to exempt beyond the "physical ingredients" rule. Secondly, an
attempt by the legislature to extend the test beyond "physical ingredi-
ents" is quite likely if viewed in light of sales tax economics. The court
should have placed greater emphasis on the economic "evils" the legisla-
ture might mitigate with a "used in manufacturing" exemption. Thus,
the court forced a statutory construction contrary to the result that
could be easily reached by using the right tools. This could be justified
only if some all-important legislative cross-purpose required it,47 but
certainly, nothing of such magnitude seemed to exist in this case.
43 Id. at 547, 81 P.2d at 756.
44 But see Redlich, note 35 suPra.
45 Note that the court did not speak in terms of narrowing a broad phrase. This may
have been an acceptable approach if purpose so dictated. It felt that the words required
the "physical ingredients" test in themselves and the dictionaries would allow no broader
construction. Actually, it can be argued here that the words could not bear the attributed
meaning, in which case this meaning could never prevail. See text accompanying note 22,
supra.
46 The court spoke against the redundancy point in this way:
The solicitude of the legislature to make dear that in "processing," to be tax
exempt tangible personal property must actually and factually enter into the
subject matter transformed in the process, as in manufacturing proper it is re-
quired to become a constituent of the product, logically accounts for the cir-
cumstance that the two distinctive clauses under examination were drawn to
effect a substantially similar result and dispels any suggestion that the clauses
are redundant.
Bedford v. Colorado Coal & Iron Corp., supra note 37, at 550, 81 P.2d at 757. There
was no warrant in purpose for this extensive grammatical distortion.
47 Hart & Sacks, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1412.
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The only real question should have been the extent of the exemp-
tion beyond "physical ingredients." Probably all sales to manufac-
turers should not be exempt." The administrative difficulty of the
"used in manufacturing" test perhaps warranted some hesitation in
reading it into the statute. However, the administrative difficulties of
the "dissipation" test do not seem great enough to infer a supervening
cross-purpose to defeat any extension whatsoever. The significant point
is simply that the legislature could not have more clearly expressed a
purpose to further comply with prevalent economic theory of sales
taxation unless it actually spelled out such purpose in print. The
court's tour de force completely frustrated this effort.
It is appropriate to discuss briefly two other arguments employed
by the court to support its position. The court pointed to a section
of the taxing statute which exempted sales of electricity, coal and gas
from the sales tax. This provision might be appropriate for gas and
electricity because they might not be considered tangible personal
property. But to exempt coal used in manufacturing would just dupli-
cate the provision at issue if the taxpayer's reading of it was correct.
Obviously, other explanations for the inclusion of coal can be offered;
e.g., as a forceful fuel lobby, and the uncertainty of what the courts
would do with the provision at issue. The court also referred to the
fact that although the treasurer construed the sales tax act to exempt
nothing but "physical ingredients," the legislature reenacted it with-
out making any change. Does this argument have any force? If so,
does it apply to general tax codes? 49
Unlike the Colorado Supreme Court in the Bedford case, the
Alabama Supreme Court has often construed its tax statute in the
spirit of the "final consumer" theory of sales taxation, even though it
never has given theory express recognition.
The taxpayer in State v. Southern Kraft Corp.5 0 manufactured
paper and pulp. The commissioner assessed taxpayer for its pur-
chases of salt cake, sulphur, lime, starch, hydrate of lime and
chlorine used in the process of manufacture. The taxpayer protested
on the ground that the sales tax exempted "physical ingredients." 5'
The evidence showed that the chemicals were used to produce a cook-
ing liquor in which wood chips were boiled to make pulp. Through
chemical reaction, 6/10 of I percent of the salt cake remained as an in-
gredient of the pulp and went into the paper; 2/100 of 1 percent or less
48 See text accompanying note 33, supra.
49 Hart & Sacks, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1401-05.
0 243 Ala. 223, 8 So. 2d 886 (1942).
51 Ala. Code, tit. 51, § 787(d) (1940).
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of the hydrate of lime and chlorine became an ingredient of the pulp
and went into the paper; and 1 percent of the sulphur remained in the
paper. The commissioner contended that the dominant purpose in the
use of these chemicals was to form the cooking liquor and the per-
centage of chemicals that remained in the paper was due to mere
happenstance. The court said:
To adopt the "dominant purpose" thought or the percentage
basis for computing the tax would be tantamount to writing into the
statute something the legislature did not, and would be judicial
legislation.52
The court, in holding for the taxpayer, seemed primarily interested in
the fact that the chemicals, on analysis, were detectable in the finished
product.53
In Alabama-Georgia Syrup Co. v. State,5 4 the taxpayer processed
sugar which it sold in fiber boxes to wholesalers (the immediate con-
tainers for the syrup were bottles and cans). The statute involved
defined as wholesale sales purchases of "the furnished container or
label thereof" '55 of manufactured or compounded products. The com-
missioner levied on the purchase of the fiber boxes by the taxpayer
on the grounds that they were only for taxpayer's convenience in ship-
ping and not for use as containers of the syrup. The final consumer
buys the syrup in the cans or bottles so that the fiber boxes cannot fit
within the phrase "furnished container." The court held for the tax-
payer, stating:
There is nothing in the statute which says the product shall
have actual contact with the container. Nor does the statute say
that when there is more than one container of the product, only the
inner container is to be excluded from the tax. As it is not denied
that the fiber boxes are "furnished," they seem to qualify for ex-
clusion from the tax under the statute.56
Reels and spools necessary to make cables marketable have been
held to fall within the term "container," though the Alabama Supreme
Court recognized this to be an unusual meaning of the word.
57
52 State v. Southern Kraft Corp., supra note 50, at 227, 8 So. 2d at 890.
53 Compare Smith Oil & Refining Co. v. Department of Finance, 371 Ill. 405, 21
N.E.2d 292 (1939).
54 253 Ala. 49, 42 So. 2d 292 (1949).
55 Ala. Code, tit. 51, § 787(d) (1940).
56 Alabama-Georgia Syrup Co. v. State, supra note 54, at 53, 42 So. 2d at 800.
57 State v. Reynolds Metal Co., 263 Ala. 657, 83 So. 2d 709 (1955). For another
instance of liberal construction of the "furnished container" provision, see State v. Taylor,
262 Ala. 639, 80 So. 2d 618 (1954).
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In State v. Wertheimer Bag Co.," s the commissioner argued that
only the farmer prepares agricultural products for market within the
meaning of the exemption at issue 9 so that when the bag company
sells bags to peanut hullers, who separate the kernel from the hull and
bag the hulled peanuts for sale to confectioners, the company is liable.
The court investigated legislative history of the section and concluded
that the legislature would have specified farmers if that was the only
group it intended to exempt. Peanuts are an agricultural commodity
and "preparing them for market may well include shelling, since they
are not marketable in the shells or pods."6 ° The court also held tax-
payer not liable for sales of bags to nursery owners who use them to
hold soil around the roots of stock for shipment. The court found in
dictionaries and other cases that the term agriculture could include
horticulture and that there would be no purpose served in distinguish-
ing horticulture from agriculture in this instance, even though it may
not fit the "ordinary" meaning of the word. Thus the Alabama court
has often construed liberally with the result that no tax is paid before
goods reach the final consumer.
But the Alabama judicial attitude seems quite different in con-
struing the statutory provision which exempts, "machines used in
mining, quarrying, compounding, processing, and manufacturing of
tangible personal property . . . 2'" The Alabama court narrowed this
statutory language to exempt only machines used directly on the pro-
duction line. 2 Machines used to remove ash from furnaces on the
production line; machines used to repair, inspect or maintain produc-
tion line components; 6" machines used to transport goods from one
area of a plant to another 6 4-all have fallen outside the exemption."5
Why this concern for the production line? The court may reason-
ably differentiate between manufacturing, administration, distribution,
etc., since the provision is too awkward and obtuse to suggest a legis-
Gs 253 Ala. 124, 43 So. 2d 824 (1949).
59 Ala. Code tit. 51, § 755(i) (1940):
"The gross proceeds of the sale, or sales, of ... bags ... used in preparing
agricultural products, dairy products, grove or garden products for market . . .
when such ... bags . . . are to be sold or furnished by the seller of the products
contained therein to the purchaser of such products."
6 State v. Wertheimer Bag Co., supra note 53, at 127, 43 So. 2d at 827.
61 Ala. Code, fit. 51, § 755(p) (1940).
62 State v. Calumet & Hecla Consol. Copper, 259 Ala. 225, 66 So. 2d 726 (1953).
63 Alabama Power Co. v. State, 267 Ala. 617, 103 So. 2d 780 (1958).
64 Alabama-Georgia Syrup Co. v. State, supra note 54.
65 See also Southern Natural Gas Co. v. State, 261 Ala. 222, 73 So. 2d 731 (1953).
For a case which stresses the "production line" criterion and then stretches it beyond
recognition, see State v. Try-Me Bottling Co., 257 Ala. 123, 57 So. 2d 537 (1952).
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lative purpose to follow economic theory so far as to exclude purchases
of all machines for any use by the producer. But within the "com-
pounding, processing, and manufacturing" categories, why does the
court create further limitations with "production line" analysis? Unlike
the interpretation given the provisions discussed earlier, the Alabama
judicial approach here seems out of tune with the "final consumer"
theory of sales taxation. One may try to explain this by pointing out
that the "machines" provision is an express exemption while the "fur-
nished container" and "ingredient" provisions are part of the definition
of wholesale sale. Courts generally say they construe exemptions
strictly against the taxpayer. This explanation answers little since the
"bags in agriculture" provision of the Wertheimer case was also an
exemption. Moreover, the Alabama Supreme Court tempered the gen-
eral rule when it said in State v. Calumet & Hecla Consol. Copper,66
concerning a "machine" case:
It is true that exemption statutes are to be strictly construed in
favor of the taxing authority . . . but the court will indulge in no
strained construction to give effect to this rule where a fair interpre-
tation of the legislative intent may lead to a contrary construction. 67
One could conclude that from a theoretical viewpoint the court
is simply inconsistent. It may be as simple as that since the court
never expressly speaks of economic theory and could well contradict
itself on a level of analysis it never considered. In defense of the court,
it could be asserted that the legislative directive to avoid pyramiding,
etc., came through clearly enough in the "furnished container," "ingre-
dient," and "agriculture" cases to warrant its prevailing over the cross-
purpose of raising adequate revenue; but the same directive could not
prevail over the revenue raising interest where heavy machinery was
at issue and the taxes at stake more substantial. Such reasoning is not
convincing because it is questionable that the revenue involved in the
former type of case totaled less than in the latter because in the for-
mer there was greater frequency of purchases. More importantly, the
"machines" exemption indicated that the legislature proposed to follow
the economic theory of "final consumption" within the "compounding,
processing, manufacturing" rubric; any narrowing of the meanings of
these words defeated this purpose, particularly where large sums were
involved and the evils of pyramiding, and the like, more apparent.
The legislature wished to raise revenue, but it also made clear a desire
to avoid "evils" arising from its tax measure, and the court should
assist by giving effect to the reasonable implications of the words
66 Supra note 62.
67 Id. at 232, 66 So. 2d at 729-30.
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"compounding, processing, or manufacturing" in light of the legislative
objective. This may not warrant extremely liberal construction, but it
does argue against narrowing.
Thus, this court also failed to delve deeply enough to uncover
legislative purpose. If it had, its decisions would not have been incon-
sistent, and it would have construed the "machine" exemption in the
same open spirit that characterized its "ingredients" and "furnished
container" decisions.
The Supreme Court of Michigan" has often liberally construed
its "used in industrial processing" provision.69 The court has been
restrictive only in differentiating between such operations as "indus-
trial processing," administration, and distribution. 0 The cases do not
speak of the production line.
The case of Minnaert, d.b.a. Minnaert Constr. Co. v. Dep't of
Revenue,71 demonstrates this. Here the taxpayer contracted with
the White Pine Copper Company to construct dams and ponds which
served to separate waste copper tailings from the water that ran
through the copper mill. The water could then be reused. The taxpayer
bought heavy earth moving equipment for the exclusive purpose of
fulfilling this contract. The court thought the disposition of waste to
be "an essential part of White Pine's process of manufacture" 72 and
exempted the taxpayer from the use tax on the earth moving equip-
ment. It spoke of the equipment as permitting a more "economical"
manufacturing operation. Obviously, this decision is extreme.7" The
68 The Michigan lower courts have been restrictive. See, e.g, Dean Chemicals, Inc. v.
Dep't of Rev., P-H State and Local Tax Serv. ff 23004; Smith Co. v. Dep't of Rev.,
P-H State and Local Tax Serv. ff 23545.
69 Sec. 4a. No person subject to tax under this act need include in the amount
of his gross proceeds used for the computation of the tax any sales of tangible
personal property:
(g) To persons for use or consumption in industrial processing: Provided, that
the term 'industrial processing' shall not be deemed to include tangible personal
property permanently affxed and becoming a structural part of real estate.
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 7.525 (1960).
70 See, e.g., Bay Bottled Gas Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 334 Mich. 326, 74 N.W.2d
37 (195).
71 366 Mich. 117, 113 N.W.2d 868 (1962). The statute at issue in this case was the
use tax statute. This factor seems insignificant in this situation.
72 Id. at 124, 113 N.W.2d at 871.
73 Indeed, it may be argued that the case went too far in that the legislative purpose,
while warranting liberal construction, did not warrant extension to the point of distortion
of the term "used in industrial processing" which may be true in this decision. For another
case of extremism, see State Bd. of Equilization v. Standard Oil & Gas Co., 51 Wyo. 237,
65 P.2d 1095 (1937), where the court exempted as a service "used in the production or
entering into the processing of" oil the purchase of transportation services which moved
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dams were far removed from the reduction of ore to pure copper even
if "essential" to it, and the earth moving machinery was even farther
removed. A test based on economy of operation is quite a maverick.
This treatment of waste removal can be contrasted with that of the
Alabama case which would not exempt machinery used to remove
ashes from furnaces in the production line. 4
Another example of this court's attitude can be found in Michigan
Allied Dairy Ass'n v. Board of Tax Administration.75 In that case,
one of the issues was whether "milk bottles and cans purchased by
milk processors are used in industrial processing, or whether they are
only convenient containers in which to deliver the contents."7 6 The
court found that the bottles and cans contained the milk while it
underwent refrigeration to preserve it from contamination by bacteria
before delivery to customers. The court held that since the refrigera-
tion kept the milk suitable for marketing, it thereby became part of
the industrial process even though there was no processing in the sense
of adding to or changing the product. 77 The court next considered,
"whether the exemption should apply inasmuch as the milk bottles and
cans are also used as delivery containers, the latter use not being
industrial processing."78 The court said:
Where an article has more than one use, one or more (but not
all) of which are within the agricultural producing or industrial
processing exemptions, the legislature could have provided that the
portion of the value of the article representing its nonexempt uses
should bear the tax, but it has not done so. 79
In another aspect of the case, the court concluded that cans used by
farmers to preserve milk until it is picked up by creamery trucks fall
within the "agricultural producing" exemption.80 In another case, a
purchaser of water softeners had to pay no tax for softeners "used
in industrial processing" which in this case meant renting them to
stores, hotels, restaurants, and manufacturing plants. He was required
to pay the levy for softeners rented to homeowners for domestic use.8'
crude oil through pipe lines from producing fields to a terminal. From there it was
delivered to the refinery. Judicial discretion may have been in order here to distinguish
between acquisition and production or processing.
74 Alabama Power Co. v. State, supra note 63.
75 302 Mich. 643, 5 N.W.2d 516 (1942).
76 Id. at 646, 5 N.W.2d at 517.
77 Contrast this holding with the more restrictive approach of the Oklahoma court
in Southwest Chemical Supply, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 352 P.2d 391 (Okla. 1960).
78 Supra note 75, at 649-50, 5 N.W.2d at 518.
79 Ibid.
80 Mich. Pub. Acts, Act 167 § I(b) (1933), as amended by Act 313 (1939).
81 Kress, d.b.a. Jackson Soft Water Service v. Dep't of Revenue, 322 Mich. 590, 34
[Vol. 27
1966] INTERPRETATION OF SALES TAX STATUTES 449
It cannot be overemphasized that the Michigan court never ex-
pressly referred to a theory of the sales taxation in any of these cases.
In Allied Dairy it supported its approach by saying, "we have re-
peatedly held that the scope of the tax laws may not be extended by
implication or a forced construction."82 This argues against a too strict
construction of the exemption, but the court cited no other principle
of interpretation to justify its extreme liberalism. For this reason it
may be concluded that the only reason for a difference between the
Alabama and Michigan results is the phrase "industrial process-
ing" as opposed to "processing, compounding, and manufacturing."
Yet, the Michigan court certainly could have restricted "industrial
processing" as Alabama restricted its provision. Perhaps the Michigan
court simply did not express the economic theory that really guided
its decisions. This in itself should be condemned. Nevertheless, these
decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court can be justified as liberal
construction of a broad "manufacturing" exemption designed to har-
monize the sales tax with widely accepted notions of taxing only ulti-
mate personal consumption. Unfortunately, the court never sought to
uncover such a design.
C. Legislative Floundering
The Wyoming Supreme Court employed the purposive approach
in State Board of Equalization v. Oil Wells Supply Co. 3 Here
again, the commissioner contended that an article could not be
exempt unless it physically entered into the processed commodity. The
court rightly rejected this contention, citing legislative history, the
phrasing of the section at issue, and the "ultimate consumer" theory
of sales taxation. The court found nothing very meaningful in the
N.W.2d 501 (1948). The court required no tax on 10% of the softeners which the tax-
payer established were used in "industrial processing." The court might have analyzed
this case in terms of evasion and held taxpayer liable on all purchases of softeners. That
is, when softeners may be so easily interchanged between "industrial" and domestic uses,
the likelihood of evasion and the administrative difficulty of supervising are such that a
legislative cross-purpose may arise to bring complete inclusion. See Professor Due's
analysis note 35 supra.
82 Supra note 75, at 650, 5 N.W.2d at 518.
83 51 Wyo. 226, 65 P.2d 1093 (1937). The relevant statute read:
Each purchase of tangible personal property or service made by a person en-
gaged in the business of producing, furnishing, manufacturing, or compounding
for sale, profit or use, any article, substance, service or commodity which is
actually used in the production of, or enters into the processing of, or becomes
an ingredient or component part of the article ... he manufactures ... shall be
deemed a wholesale sale and shall be exempt from taxation under this act.
Wyo. C.L., C. 102 § 2(f) (1935).
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statutory phrase "actually used in a production" and certainly cannot
be criticized for this. The most that can be said for "actually" is that
it was included to serve the same purpose as "directly" in other
statutes.8 4 Or, it may mean to differentiate between active use and
idleness. But it hardly suggests, in context, that the "ingredients" rule
alone must prevail.
The Wyoming legislature, however, was either unhappy with this
interpretation or changed its mind, for in 1937 it enacted a new pro-
vision which excluded only "physical ingredients" and "furnished con-
tainers." 5 The extreme decision in another case"6 may have prompted
this change, but if this were true the legislature could easily have
amended so as to make clear that the court should distinguish between
acquisition, administration, processing, and distribution. The law-
makers probably decided that the state needed more revenue than
could be raised with a broad "used in manufacturing" exemption.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the court construed correctly in the
Wells Supply Co. case while the legislature floundered in indecision
about the extensiveness of the exemption.
Legislative ineptness accounted for a rather amusing interpreta-
tive difficulty in Michigan in the earliest days of the sales tax. The
Michigan Legislature enacted Public Acts of 1933, Act No. 167, which
proclaimed:
The term "sale at retail" means any transaction by which is
transferred for consideration the ownership of tangible personal
property, when such transfer is made in the ordinary course of the
transferor's business and is made to the transferee for consumption
or use or for any other purpose than for resale in the form of
tangible personal property.
The Board of Tax Administration interpreted this provision to
allow for an "ingredients" rule in the manufacturing area." The legis-
lature seemed dissatisfied, for on July 17, 1933, it passed the following
resolution:
Resolved, that the legislative intent, in passing Act 167, Public
Acts of 1933, was to exclude from provisions of the act any sale of
any thing used exclusively in the manufacturing, assembling, pro-
ducing, preparing, or wrapping, crating, and/or otherwise preparing
for delivery any tangible personal property to be sold .... ss
81 See text accompanying notes 90-95 infra.
85 Wyo. CL., C. 102 § 2(f) (1937).
86 Supra note 73.
87 All the background in this Michigan episode comes from the case of Boyer-Camp-
bell Co. v. Fry, 271 Mich. 282, 260 N.W. 165 (1935).
88 See note 87, supra.
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Obviously, if this resolution meant for a broad "used in manu-
facturing" exemption to prevail in the state, the statutory "resale"
language was hardly appropriate. Resolutions of this nature do not
have the force of law. 9 Faced with this difficulty the administrators
continued with the "ingredients" rule. One month later, the adminis-
trators decided to force the resolution into the statutory provision and
declared a broad manufacturing exemption. However, on the advice
of the State Attorney General, the administrative board returned to the
"ingredients" rule. The legislature responded with another resolution
requesting the board to comply with the prior resolution of intent.
At this point, a number of manufacturers brought an action for de-
claratory judgment of their liability under the sales tax. The court,
in an otherwise ambiguous decision, scolded: "The legislature at-
tempted to clarify by resolution, when it should have expressed its
intention clearly in the first instance or by later amendment."9 0 The
court could do little more than approve of the "physical ingredients"
rule in this instance, for the "resale" language simply would not allow
for broader construction unless "resale" were defined in the economic
sense of cost being passed on to the ultimate consumer. The court can
hardly be blamed for not countenancing this distortion. This decision
evidently goaded the lawmakers into action, for in 1935 they amended
the act to provide for the broad "used in industrial processing" ex-
emption discussed earlier.
Some have tried to explain the peculiar legislative behavior in
this episode." Whatever the reason, the interpretative difficulty here
stemmed from ineffective performance of the legislative rather than
judicial function.
The best example of legislative floundering in the "manufactur-
ing" area exists in statutes which exempt sales of property used or
consumed "directly" in manufacturing, processing, etc..
A study of three states which operate with a statute of this nature
reveals the difficulties involved. In Iowa, the word is nearly ignored.
The Iowa Supreme Court has exempted waste removal equipment,92
case packing machinery in a brewery,93 and turbo-generators used by
a manufacturer to produce electricity to run his plant.94 The Iowa
89 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction 260-68, 3801-0S (3d ed. 1943).
90 Boyer-Campbell Co. v. Fry, supra note 87, at 288, 260 N.W. at 171.
91 Taylor, "Toward Rationality in a Retail Sales Tax," 5 Nat'l Tax J. 79 (1952).
92 City of Ames v. State Tax Comm'n, 246 Iowa 1016, 71 N.W.2d 15 (1955). Com-
pare Alabama Power Co. v. State, supra note 63.
93 Zoller Brewery Co. v. State Tax Comm'r, 232 Iowa 1104, 5 N.W.2d 643 (1942).
94 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 250 Iowa 193, 92 N.W.2d 129
(1958).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
court announced its recognition of the word "directly,"9 5 but the test
seems to be whether the items involved provide for a more efficient
manufacturing operation. 6
In Georgia, on the other hand, the court saw nothing but the word
"directly" in State v. Cherokee Brick & Tile Co. 7 A brick manufac-
turer had to pay a sales tax on artificial gas whose flame caused physi-
cal and chemical changes in raw materials used to produce the bricks.
The court regarded "direct" as meaning no intervention of person or
thing between the item and the manufactured product. Here, it was
not the gas but the flaming gas and its heat that served as the catalyst.
There was intervention of spark and combustion.
Ohio takes a middle ground between these extremes. The court
interprets "directly" much as Alabama interprets its "used in manu-
facturing" exemption. The "chain of production" is key. The exemp-
tion seems to apply only to things,
absolutely necessary and most proximately used in the making of the
product which is sold. Perhaps the test is better stated in the form
of a question; namely: What is the minimum amount of equipment
and materials necessary to make the product which is going to be
sold?98
Perhaps "directly" should be construed as a directive to differ-
entiate between manufacturing, acquisition, administration, etc., i.e.,
that it is the legislature's way of assuring that "manufacturing" is
limited in scope so that all sales to manufacturers are not exempted.
Certainly, the lathe is more "directly" a part of producing goods than
a typewriter or automobile. Yet, there is little basis for criticizing other
views. The word "directly" is simply confusing and vague in this con-
text. The word may indicate that the legislature is less concerned with
pursuing theory than with raising revenue. Ohio, and conceivably even
Georgia, may be best fulfilling the overriding legislative objective.
Unless some rudiments of purpose can be gleaned from the circum-
stances surrounding the enactment, "directly" forces the court to rely
heavily on intuitive powers in settling disputes.
95 Dain Mfg. Co. v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 237 Iowa 531, 22 N.V.2d 786 (1946).
96 City of Ames v. State Tax Comm'n, supra note 92, at 1029, 71 N.W.2d at 23.
97 89 Ga. App. 235, 79 S.E.2d 322 (1953).
98 Goffey, "Interpretation of Exemptions under the New Ohio Sales Tax," 30 U.
Cinc. L. Rev. 457, 460 (1961). See, e.g., Anderson v. May, 157 Ohio St. 407, 105 N.E.2d
648 (1952); Jackson Iron & Steel Co. v. Glander, 154 Ohio St. 369, 96 NYE.2d 21 (1950);
Mead Corporation v. Glander, 153 Ohio St. 539, 93 N.E.2d 19 (1950); Fyr-Fyter Co.
v. Glander, 150 Ohio St. 118, 80 N.E.2d 776 (1948); Pioneer Linen Supply Co. v. Evatt,
146 Ohio St. 248, 65 N.E.2d 711 (1946).
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III. SERVICES
Few states significantly tax services. Most limit the levy to sales
of tangible personal property.P9 This has prompted courts to distin-
guish between transactions in which property is sold and those in
which services are rendered with, perhaps, some property incidentally
transferred. Much diversity of judicial opinion arises from this at-
tempt. At least five different tests have evolved. Transactions may be
of nontaxable services because:
(1) The materials used by the taxpayer in fulfilling his deal with
his customer are destroyed in the process; they are not transferred as
such to the customer.
(2) The final product could not be used generally by anyone other
than the customer, either because a special order was involved which
could be of no use to other buyers or because the article produced
embodied the buyer's intangible property.
(3) The materials used constituted only an insignificant part of the
cost of the job; the services provided by the taxpayer were the pre-
dominant factor in the charges made to the customer.
(4) The taxpayer's occupation is traditionally regarded by the com-
munity as the rendition of a service, not the sale of goods.100
Transactions may be taxable sales of property where the end-
product transferred is tangible personal property so the tax should
apply.
It has been suggested that courts err when they do not distinguish
sales of property from services on the basis of the economic theories
of consumption taxation.1"' Professor Hellerstein argues that courts
should take cognizance of the fact that, with very few exceptions,102
where a transaction is not taxed because it is regarded as the rendering
of a service, the serviceman or repairer is considered the "consumer"
of the articles employed in rendering the service. Thus, if the tax is
not levied on the sale by the serviceman, it is levied on the sale by
the supplier to the serviceman. The only real question then---.the
stage at which the transaction is to be taxed."' 3 If this is the issue,
consumption taxation theories would lead courts to resolve doubts as
to whether services or property are involved in a way to make the
transaction one of "property." The tax would then be levied at the
later stage.
99 Due, Sales Taxation 294-95 (1957).
100 Hellerstein, "The Scope of the Taxable Sale Under Sales and Use Tax Acts: Sales
as Distinguished from Services," 11 Tax L. Rev. 261, 272 (1956).
01 Id. at 274.
102 See text accompanying notes 117-36 infra.
103 Hellerstein, supra note 101, at 273.
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One must be sympathetic, however, with the judicial confusion
in this area and hesitant to criticize. After all, there is no warrant in
consumption tax theory for differentiating between expenditures for
property and those for services. There are plausible legislative pur-
poses that could have produced this distinction. One is a notion that
there should be no "tax on labor,"' 0 4 and another is the distaste for
taxing such essential services as medical and dental care. Thus, pur-
pose and theory assist little in answering the question of how to treat
the optometrist or the printer. In the area of "manufacturing" pro-
visions, there is room to chastise courts for a lack of appreciation of
economic theory and the nonrestrictive interpretation implicit in it.
In that area, the legislatures, at least with the "used in manufacturing"
exemption, make an affirmative effort to comply with the fundamentals
of "final personal consumption" theory. Here, however, the provision
at issue allows for no impetus in the direction of expanding the word
"property." There are legislative cross-purposes that cut directly
against liberal construction. If anything, in this area, the legislature
has manifested a purpose to subjugate economic theory to other more
dominant considerations. At least this writer can sort out no dominant
purpose for judicial guidance in distinguishing services from property.
The difficulty, as with "directly" in the manufacturing area, seems
inherent in the enactment. The court may have little alternative but
to meander through dictionaries, trade practices, and other indicators
of "ordinary" meanings. This, of course, does not excuse instances
of obvious unfairness and discrimination in this area which are pointed
out by Professor Hellerstein °5 and which certainly are not within the
legislative purpose.
IV. SALES FoR RESALE
A definition of "retail sale" which includes sales for "use or con-
sumption" and excludes "sales for resale" evidences a legislative at-
tempt to avoid the evils of inequality of tax burden, pyramiding, and
discrimination against non-integrated distribution systems of a turn-
over tax. With this in mind the courts should cooperate with the legis-
latures in construing statutes so as to circumvent these "evils." Yet
some courts have not seen fit to do so, as a few cases dealing with
containers demonstrate. 0 6 In these cases the transactions at issue were
104 Due, "Retail Sales Taxation in Theory and Practice," 3 Nat1 Tax J. 314, 320
(19 0).
105 Allowing repairmen and customers to determine tax liability by the statement
of relative price charged for services and property seems quite irrational. See Heller-
stein, supra note 100 at 282, 292.
106 City Paper Co. v. Long, 235 Ala. 652, 180 So. 324 (1938); Wiseman v. Arkan-
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sales of packaging material to retailers and manufacturers for use in
distributing goods. The courts particularly focused on the fact that
these retailers were not in the business of selling packaging goods to
the public-only potatoes, biscuits, or shirts. This led to the conclusion
that the containers involved were not sold for resale but for use by the
retailer, and that it was immaterial that the cost to the retailer was
passed on to the consumer.
But the fact that the cost is figured into the price of the resold
item is not immaterial, since this gives rise to the "mischief" the leg-
islature sought to mitigate. These courts could easily have construed
"resale" to include this type of transaction by the retailer and cer-
tainly a definition of "use or consumption" in the sense of ultimate
personal consumer could apply."0 7 In a later Arkansas case'0 8 the court
so construed "resale" when it was proved that the packaging added
twelve to fourteen cents to the price of the goods involved. The court
evidently needed a vivid picture of the economic realities.
There may be some reason, however, for taxing containers sold
to the merchant or manufacturer, although the courts never mention
it. If a state taxes all producer goods and exempts only "sales for
resale" it seems clear that the legislature is not particularly concerned
about production integration, pyramiding, or inequitable tax burdens.
It is primarily seeking to remedy vertical distribution integration. The
taxation of containers may bring about the former "evils," but not the
latter. Thus, the legislative purpose behind the "resale" phraseology
does not necessarily extend to packaging material. All states do at
least have a "physical ingredients" rule and this indicates concern for
"evils" other than the merging of the distribution system. But unless
the state's legislature has enacted a fairly broad manufacturing ex-
emption, the court may be justified in finding no directive to categorize
container transactions as "sales for resale" rather than for "use or
consumption."
As seen earlier, Alabama does broadly exempt producer goods.
It is instructive to follow the fate of containers in that state. In 1939,
the legislature added to the "physical ingredients" portion of its
"wholesale sale" definition so that it exempted the "furnished con-
tainers" of a "manufactured or compounded" product0 9 Why did it
sas Wholesale Grocers Ass'n, 192 Ark. 313, 90 S.W.2d 981 (1937); Warren v. Fink, 146
Kan. 716, 97 N.W.2d 384 (1937).
107 For this approach, see, e.g., American Molasses Co. v. McGoldrick, 281 N.Y. 269,
22 N.E.2d 369 (1939).
108 McCarroll v. Scott Paper Box Co., 195 Ark. 1105, 93 S.W.2d 453 (1938).
109 Ala. Code, tit. 51, § 752 (1958):
The term "wholesale sale" shall include a sale of tangible personal property
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limit the change to containers of "manufactured or compounded"
products? Was this a directive to the court to continue construing as
retail sales transfers of material that packaged unaltered goods sold
by a retailer? This question faced the Alabama court in State v.
Albright & Wood, Inc."0 The court answered in the affirmative on
the ground that a case decided just before the legislative change ap-
parently allowed taxation of bottles and boxes which packaged both
compounded and unaltered goods. The change was responsive to only
the former levy-the implication being that the legislature approved
the levy on the latter containers."1
It is not possible to strongly criticize this decision, but it can be
questioned. Arguably that the more accurate implication was that the
legislature wanted to exempt all containers. In other words, the 1939
enactment can be seen as giving momentum to the inclusion of con-
tainer sales in the term "sales for resale" rather than drawing the
outer limits of container exemption. Comparing the 1939 act with its
predecessor," 2 the word "compounded" had no special significance. It
appeared in the earlier act so that it cannot be said to exist only as a
partial reaction to the container decisions. A reasonable way to read
the series of enactments is simply to say that the "furnished container"
provision was a reaction to the container decisions; it was tacked on
to the "physical ingredients" provision because this seemed most con-
venient; and the fact that the "ingredients" provision contained the
word "compounded" should not significantly influence interpretation
of the "resale" provision. The only significant fact is that the legis-
lature saw taxation of furnished containers as impeding its overall
effort to tax final personal consumption. This is particularly true in
light of Alabama's broad "machines in manufacturing" exemption113
By far the most interesting skirmish in the "resale" area took
place in Illinois. The Illinois statute," 4 passed in 1933, could not be
or products (including iron ore) to a manufacturer or compounder which enters
into and becomes an ingredient or component part of the tangible personal prop-
erty or products which he manufactures or compounds for sale, and the furnished
container and label thereof.
110 268 Ala. 607, 109 So. 2d 844 (1959).
11 Durr Drug Co. v. Long, 237 Ala. 689, 188 So. 873 (1939).
112 The term "wholesale sale" shall include a sale of tangible personal property
or products to a manufacturer, mine, quarry operator, or compounder which
enters into and becomes an ingredient or component part of the tangible personal
property or products which he manufactures and machinery used in such com-
pounding, mining, quarry operator [sic], manufacturing, or processing.
Ala. GA. Act 126, p. 126 (1936-37).
113 Ala. Code tit. 51, § 755(p) (1940).
114 "Sale at retail" means any transfer of the ownership of, or title to, tangible
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labeled sales tax since that was prohibited by the state constitution,
so it was imposed on the privilege of selling at retail.
The first pertinent case under the statute was Bradley Supply
Co. v. Ames,"' which held that those engaged in the occupation of
selling plumbing supplies to contractors were not subject to tax. The
contractors were not the ultimate "users or consumers" since they
transferred the supplies to the owner of the real estate. Here was a
neat application of "final consumer" economics.
The difficulty began when the question of tax liability of the
contractors arose. In Herlihy Mid-Continent Co. v. Nudelman," the
court held that, "plaintiffs did not hold themselves out as vendors of
the materials finished. . . ."11 The identity of the materials was
destroyed, and if there was any sale, it was of the completed sewers
ready to be used. So, there could be no occupation tax on the con-
tractors since they did not sell tangible personal property. Thus there
was no tax anywhere along the line. This anomaly spread throughout
the services area. Shoe repairmen,118 optometrists"' and doctors 20
paid no tax because they did not vend but only transferred property
incidentally with the furnishing of services. On the other hand, vendors
of leather to shoe repairmen,"' of optical goods to optometrists, 22
and of medical supplies to hospitals and doctors 2 3 suffered no levy
since they did not sell to the ultimate "users or consumers."
At this point, was the court in error? It would seem that the
court should have abandoned the consumption taxation meaning or,
as the Illinois court put it, "the ordinary and popular meaning"'12 4
of the words "use or consumption." It was wise to read this meaning
in at the outset, perhaps, as a manifestation of legislative purpose but
not when it became clear that no tax at all would be paid. The dis-
crimination in favor of service industries (or, if there was little shift-
ing, the suppliers who happened to sell to them) was immense, as was
the loss of revenue. But something can be said for the judicial position.
personal property to the purchaser for use or consumption and not for resale in
any form as tangible personal property, for a valuable consideration.
11. Ann. Stat. ch. 120, § 440 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
115 359 Ill. 162, 194 N.E. 272 (1934).
116 357 IlI. 600, 12 N.E.2d 638 (1938).
117 Id. at 604-05, 640.
118 Revzan v. Nudelman, 370 Ill. 180, 18 N.E.2d 218 (1939).
110 Babcock v. Nudelman, 367 I1. 626, 12 NI..2d 635 (1938).
120 Huston Brothers v. McKibbon, 386 IIl. 479, 54 NME.2d 564 (1944).
121 Revzan v. Nudelman, supra note 118.
122 American Optical Co. v. Nudelman, 370 IIl. 627, 19 N.E.2d 582 (1939).
123 Miller Co. v. Department of Finance, 372 Il1. 598, 25 N.E.2d 43 (1939).
124 Bradley Supply Co. v. Ames, supra note 115, at 166, 194 N.E. at 276.
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The legislature obviously had in mind discrimination against non-
service industries when it enacted the statute and it is not a likely
legislative objective to have taxation of a vendor depend on whether
the vendee will be taxed or exempted as a serviceman.
This support for the judicial position disappeared, however, in
1941 when the legislature amended the act as follows:
"Use or consumption," in addition to its usual and popular
meaning, shall be construed to include the employment of tangible
personal property by persons engaged in service occupations . . . ,
where as a necessary incident to the rendering of such services,
transfer of all or a part of the tangible personal property employed in
connection with the rendering of said services is made from the
person engaged in the service occupation . . . , to his customer or
client.125
Where the legislature so clearly expressed itself as desirous of
having a tax paid on the transfer of goods to the serviceman and even
provided for the word construction that would allow it to happen, a
court must have irrefutable reasons for adhering to another construc-
tion even if the other construction is soundly based on economic theory
or common experience. Nevertheless, the Illinois court stayed with its
original interpretation of "use or consumption."
The Stolzer Lumber'1 26 case involved a lumber dealer who sold
to contractors. The court found the amendment invalid and the
materialmen not liable because the amendment was inconsistent with
the title of the act. It said:
The transfer of property from the contractor to the owner
contemplated in the amendment, is clearly a transfer in some form
for a valuable consideration .... It is clearly apparent therefore
that this amendment introduces an inconsistency in the Retailers'
Occupation Tax Act and evidences an intent to call that a retail
sale which not only the statute itself declares shall not be such, but
which cannot, in view of the purpose of the act and settled meaning
of the term, be so defined .... Both the title and the provisions of
the act relate to a tax upon persons engaged in the business of sell-
ing tangible personal property "to purchasers for use or consump-
tion." "To purchasers for use or consumption," must, both by
commonly understood meaning and by the construction which this
court has given to the language of the act and its title, be construed
to mean, for use or consumption by such ultimate purchasers. Such
language must also mean a sale where the article sold is not to be,
in any form, transferred or resold for a valuable consideration,
since such a sale would not be for the use or consumption of such
purchaser, as the title and the act provide. 127
125 MII. Ann. Stat. ch. 120, § 440 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
126 386 1U. 334, 54 N.E.2d 554 (1944).
127 Id. at 340, 54 N.E.2d at 557.
[VOL 27
1966] INTERPRETATION OF SALES TAX STATUTES 459
The cited paragraph presents precisely the kind of judicial logic
which should be eschewed. It builds a fortress out of "commonly
understood meaning" and previous judicial construction. The court
speaks of legislative purpose but suppresses an express statement
which manifests a supervening cross-purpose to levy a tax on suppliers
of servicemen so that some revenue is raised in the chain of transac-
tions. It is not a "fact" that the "user or consumer" of the title must
be the ultimate "user or consumer." These words have no factual
meaning apart from compliance with legislative purpose. If the word
"consumer" cannot bear the meaning best suited to fulfilling the ex-
pressed legislative cross-purpose, 2 1 certainly the word "user" will ably
serve. It can mean ultimate "user" in one fact situation and temporary
"user" in another. Furthermore, the phrase "not for resale as tangible
personal property" can be narrowed to exclude sales where property is
resold only incidentally to the rendering of services if this complies
with the clear legislative objective. 29
A court might be justified in hesitating to engage in this defini-
tional hair-splitting as an original proposition, but to refuse to do so
in the face of a legislative mandate is judicial enactment rather than
judicial interpretation.
Eight years later, the Illinois court showed signs of enlightened
interpretation in Modern Dairy v. Dep't of Revenue.' 30 In this case,
the taxpayer dairy sold milk to a state hospital which gave the milk
free to its patients. The court defined "use" as "any employment of
a thing which took it off the retail market so that it was no longer the
object of a tax on the privilege of selling it at retail."''
But this bright light was snuffed out the next year in Burrows v.
Hollingswortlh.132 The taxpayer pharmaceutical companies sold medi-
cines and other medical supplies to doctors and hospitals, previously
declared servicemen. The court stressed that,
a person is not engaged in the business of selling at retail unless he
transfers tangible personal property (1) for use or consumption and
(2) not for resale in any form as tangible personal property. Both
tests must be met to justify the imposition of the tax.133
3.28 However, the serviceman was considered the ultimate consumer in Mendoza Fur
Dying Works, Inc. v. Taylor, 272 N.Y. 275, 5 N.E.2d 818 (1936); W. J. Sandberg Co. v.
State Bd. of Assessment & Review, 225 Iowa 103, 278 N.W. 643 (1938).
129 Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process; Basic Problems in the Making and Applica-
tion of Law 89-102 (tent. ed. 1958).
130 413 Ill. 53, 108 N.E.2d 8 (1952).
131 Id. at 15, 108 N.E.2d at 67.
132 415 Il. 202, 113 NE.2d 169 (1953).
133 Id. at 174, 113 N.E.2d at 208.
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The court accepted the Modern Dairy definition of "use" but distin-
guished that case on the ground that in it there was no resale to the
patients for valuable consideration as in the instant case. Thus, unlike
Modern Dairy, this case did not meet the second requirement.
And this is the way the judiciary left the interpretative problem
before it. Indeed, the court in G. S. Lyon & Sons Lumber & Mfg.
Co. v. Dep't of Revenue'34 taxed sales by materialmen to builders and
overturned the whole line of construction cases. But the court, al-
though using broad language, still concerned itself with the second
requirement and said it was met since the resale by the builder was
of real property and not tangible personal property. Thus, "the sale
to the builder is the last transfer of the materials as personal property,
and is a sale for use or consumption within the meaning of the act."' 35
The court only cleverly skirted the second requirement instead of
meeting it directly and construing "resale" to coincide with announced
legislative purpose. The legislature mooted much of this judicial dis-
cussion by enacting the Service Occupation Tax, effective August,
1961.136 It taxes servicemen on the cost price of tangible personal
property which they purchase from suppliers and retransfer as an
incident to rendering of services.
CONCLUSION
Statutory interpretation requires exhaustive intellectual effort. A
proper approach does not necessarily ease the difficulty: it helps to
make the results rationally sound. Some courts have not employed the
purposive approach. The Michigan and Alabama Supreme Courts are
examples. They drifted aimlessly through dictionaries searching for
the most oft-repeated meaning, or they spoke of "fair" construction.
This cannot be rationally defended even though purpose, at times,
supported the result. Other courts did refer to purpose, but the results
usually were disappointing. At times elaborate statements about pur-
pose were like a ritual which was prerequisite to entering the realm
of statutory interpretation. On gaining entrance, the statements were
forgotten. At other times the result reflected faulty reasoning; or, the
courts simply demonstrated a lack of hard work-too much willingness
to be guided by a superficial "purpose" instead of pursuing the more
basic and controlling.
But the courts in the sales tax area face extraordinary obstacles to
134 23 Ill. 2d 180, 177 N.E.2d 316 (1961). See also Material Service Corp. v. Dep't of
Revenue, 25 Ill. 2d 137, 183 N.E.2d 164 (1962).
135 23 Ill. 2d at 184, 177 N.E.2d at 319.
136 Ill Ann. Stat. ch. 120, §§ 103-06 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965).
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applying (intelligently) the purposive approach. The legislators enact
amorphous statutes which are so fraught with cross-purposes that the
approach often lends little assistance. Also, a proper resolution of cases
in the area often requires some awareness of economic theory.
The courts can do little about the first obstacle except strive to
be equitable and consistent. The second obstacle raises interesting
questions about the process of litigation. Should courts be held re-
sponsible for the intricacies of the economic theory of sales taxation?
Where reasoned elaboration of the legislative directive is impossible
without knowledge of the economic theory which it advances or re-
jects, the economic theory must be explored. The goal must be ration-
ality, and rationality requires knowledge.
How can the court acquire the necessary knowledge? Adminis-
trators could assist somewhat, but reasonable doubts arise concerning
their sophistication in economics. The regulations could contain more
intensive background analysis. Faced with the task of more fully ex-
pressing the reasons in support, administrators might frame rules more
soundly based on legislative purpose. But, probably the primary source
of information must be the lawyer's brief. As in anti-trust cases, sales
tax litigation calls for versatile lawyership--lawyers with great facility
for blending economic and legal concepts. Lawyers must fully appre-
ciate and develop legislative purpose before the judiciary can be made
to shoulder blame for faulty decision making where purpose is ascer-
tainable.
The problems are complex. The legislator, the judge, and the
lawyer have much work to do. Until each fully meets institutional and
professional responsibilities, the proper rationality cannot determine
the solutions.
